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Abstract
The ability to represent concepts and the relationships between them is critical to human cognition. How does the brain code
relationships between items that share basic conceptual properties (e.g., dog and wolf) while simultaneously representing
associative links betweendissimilar items that co-occur in particular contexts (e.g., dog and bone)? To clarify the neural bases of
these semantic components in neurologically intact participants, both types of semantic relationship were investigated in an
fMRI study optimized for anterior temporal lobe (ATL) coverage. The clear principal ﬁnding was that the same core semantic
network (ATL, superior temporal sulcus, ventral prefrontal cortex) was equivalently engagedwhen participantsmade semantic
judgments on the basis of association or conceptual similarity. Direct comparisons revealed small, weaker differences for
conceptual similarity > associative decisions (e.g., inferior prefrontal cortex) and associative > conceptual similarity (e.g.,
ventral parietal cortex) which appear to reﬂect graded differences in task difﬁculty. Indeed, once reaction timewas entered as a
covariate into the analysis, no associative versus category differences remained. The paper concludes with a discussion of how
categorical/feature-based and associative relationships might be represented within a single, uniﬁed semantic system.
Key words: fMRI, hub-and-spoke model, semantic memory, taxonomic, thematic
Introduction
Investigating the nature of semantic representation has been a
core pursuit in many different disciplines, including philosophy,
linguistics, cognitive science, and neuroscience. The focus of the
current study was on the comparison between, and neural basis
of, 2 key forms of information that are extracted from semantic
memory: associations and conceptual similarities (Lin and
Murphy 2001; Crutch and Warrington 2005; Estes et al. 2011;
Kalénine et al. 2012). The central question addressed in this
study was: do semantic association and conceptual similarity
arise from neuroanatomically separable components of seman-
tic memory or are they the result of a single conceptualization
process? In particular, we contrasted the alternative predictions
made by the “dual-hub” theories of conceptualization (which
propose a neural separation of semantic associations and con-
ceptual similarity) versus the single “hub-and-spoke” framework
(which suggests that these different aspects of semantic knowl-
edge might be coded within a single framework).
Although there are lively and long-standing debates about the
underpinning mechanisms, most researchers agree that con-
cepts are formed from, and reﬂect a distillation of, our verbal
and nonverbal experience (Wittgenstein 1953; Eggert 1977;
Smith and Medin 1981; Barsalou 1999; Rogers et al. 2004; Lambon
Ralph et al. 2010). Thus, for example, we knowmany things about
the concept “,” including features of its taste, smell,
texture, visual form, knowledge of how it is made and served,
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etc. Semantic memory is, however, more than an exhaustive list
of multimodal features. Crucially, we are able to extract higher
order structures that code the relationships between concepts.
First, “associative (or thematic) relationships” reﬂect the tem-
poral and spatial co-occurrence of concepts, often contributing
to the same acts or events. Thus, for example, croissants are as-
sociated with coffee and jam, despite these concepts having dif-
ferent appearances, tastes, smells, and functions. Second, we can
generalize properties across concepts based on a sophisticated
coding of “conceptual similarity.” For instance, we can correctly
ascribe similar properties and actions to croissants, scones,
crumpets, and naan bread, despite them having very different
physical forms and occurring in different contexts. Both kinds
of relationship types are central to the normal semantic cogni-
tion of adults (Lin andMurphy 2001). Many researchers have pro-
posed different hypotheses on how these coherent, generalizable
concepts are formed and, thus, this key dimension of semantic
memory is given various theory-speciﬁc labels: family resem-
blances (Wittgenstein 1953); taxonomical/categorical similarity
(Quillian 1968); prototypicality (Rosch 1975); feature-similarity
(Smith and Medin. 1981; McRae and Cree. 2002). For the sake of
brevity, the theory-neutral term conceptual similarity will be
used hence forth.
The literature contains at least 3 types of inconclusive empir-
ical comparisons of conceptual similarity versus associative rela-
tionships. Neuropsychological investigations potentially offer
deﬁnitive information on the separability of these 2 forms of
knowledge, if a double dissociation between associative and con-
ceptual similarity could be established. Goldstein (1936, 1948)
was perhaps the ﬁrst to suggest a single dissociation in patients
with semantic aphasia (Head 1926; Jefferies and Lambon Ralph
2006). Although not formally tested, Goldstein noted that these
patients were able to detect and, perhaps were overly inﬂuenced
by, strong associations. In addition, he noted that they found it
difﬁcult to consider the more abstract notion of categorically re-
lated items (a part of his broader notion of a loss of “abstract
thinking” in semantic aphasia). A potentially related contrast
was reported by Jefferies and Lambon Ralph (2006). One of a set
of qualitative differences between semantic dementia (a neuro-
degenerative condition leading to atrophy focused on the anter-
ior temporal lobe [ATL]) and semantic aphasia (a subtype of
aphasia associated with prefrontal or temporoparietal lesions)
is a difference in picture naming errors; semantic aphasia (SA)
patients make a mixture of associative and category-related er-
rors whereas standard deviation (SD) patients almost never pro-
duce associative semantic errors.
In an innovative study of aphasic picture naming, Schwartz
et al. (2011) used voxel-based symptom–lesion mapping to relate
the likelihood of each error type to lesion distribution. When fo-
cused on the relative rates of each error type, a higher rate of taxo-
nomic errors was associated with voxel integrity in the ATL
whereas more associative/thematic errors were predicted by le-
sions in temporoparietal cortex (TPC). Schwartz et al. (2011) con-
cluded that there are separate stores for conceptual similarity
(ATL) and associative relationships (TPC), a position that we refer
to here as the “dual-hub model” (see also, Kalénine et al. 2012).
At least 3 neuropsychological phenomena do not seem to ﬁt
easily with this conclusion, however. First, all semantic aphasia
patients make amixture of category and associatively related er-
rors and, thus, there is no absolute double dissociation within
this group (Jefferies and Lambon Ralph 2006). Second, direct
assessment has established that both semantic dementia and
semantic aphasia patients are impaired at tasks requiring knowl-
edge of associative relationships, such as the Camel and Cactus
Test and the Pyramid and Palm Trees Test (Bozeat et al. 2000; Jef-
feries and Lambon Ralph 2006). Indeed, a direct comparison
showed that semantic dementia patients were actually worse
at identifying associative than conceptual similarity-based rela-
tionships, which appears incompatible with the notion that the
ATL exclusively codes conceptual similarity-based relationships
(Hoffman, Jones et al. 2013). Finally, previous investigations have
suggested that the ATL and TPC regions may underpin different
components of semantic cognition rather than different types
of semantic representation (Jefferies 2013). Although it has not
been established whether ATL regions are involved in both asso-
ciation and conceptual similarity, they appear to play a crucial
role in the representation and extraction of semantic knowledge
across modalities and categories (Patterson et al. 2007; Lambon
Ralph et al. 2010).
In contrast, semantic aphasia patients with damage to the
TPC or prefrontal cortex exhibit poorly controlled retrieval and
manipulation of semantic memory rather than impaired re-
presentation per se (Jefferies and Lambon Ralph 2006). We refer
to these executive functions as “semantic control.” This hypoth-
esis is supported by evidence from fMRI and transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (TMS) studies suggesting that prefrontal
cortex (PFC), posterior middle temporal gyrus (pMTG), and intra-
parietal sulcus may form a distributed control network (Thomp-
son-Schill et al. 1997;Wagner et al. 2001; Badre andWagner 2003;
Duncan 2010; Whitney et al. 2011; Jefferies 2013; Noonan et al.
2013; Lambon Ralph 2014). There is currently minimal informa-
tion to delineate the individual contribution of these regions in
semantic control. One possibility is that the pMTG may be rele-
vant for semantic control, whereas frontal and parietal regions
may be involved in executive function regardless of domain (Jef-
feries 2013; Noonan et al. 2013). Alternatively, the pMTGmay not
be responsible for control per se, but act as an interface between
temporal areas responsible for representation and frontoparietal
control regions.
To clarify these issues, we used fMRI to contrast associative
relationships and conceptual similarity directly, and also ma-
nipulated the level of semantic control. A second key novelty in
this study was methodological, namely a strict separation and
direct probing of associative versus conceptual knowledge. This
is an important step in that many concepts are related in both
ways (e.g., “cat” and “mouse”) and previous comparative investi-
gations have been dogged by this issue. Within experimental
psychology, semantic priming has been demonstrated for both
associative and conceptual similarity-based relations and at-
tempts to separate these different effects have led to conﬂicting
results (Shelton and Martin 1992; McRae and Boisvert 1998; Cree
et al. 1999; Lucas 2000; Hutchison 2003; Hare et al. 2009). Likewise,
previous fMRI studies comparing the 2 types of semantic rela-
tionship have found different results, ranging from no difference
to large-scale differences over both hemispheres (Kotz et al. 2002;
Kalénine et al. 2009; Sass et al. 2009). This may be because the
studies lacked appropriate stimuli for comparison, for instance
adopting taxonomically related words that are also associated
with each other (e.g., Kotz et al. 2002; Sachs et al. 2008) or using
picture stimuli, which may encourage participants to focus on
lower level perceptual similarities (e.g., Kalénine et al. 2009). Fur-
thermore, most studies have not probed knowledge of concep-
tual similarity versus associative relationships but have relied
upon implicit processing of these relationships via priming
which requires the neuroimagingmethod to detect a small subtle
behavioral effect (e.g., Sachs et al. 2008; Sass et al. 2009).
In order to explore these key theoretical questions and alter-
native hypotheses, this study was designed in the following
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manner. First, there was a direct manipulation of 2 factors: type
of semantic relationship (associative vs. conceptual similarity)
and semantic control (hard vs. easy decisions; see Table 1 for ex-
ample stimuli). Second, knowledge of each type of relationship
was directly probed in the same semantic decision task rather
than relying on secondary, implicit activation. Finally, the fMRI
datawere acquired in away that allows full coverage of the entire
semantic network including the ventral aspects of the ATL. Vari-
ous methodological issues in previous investigations have led to
inconsistent coverage and sensitivity to activation in this region
(Embleton et al. 2010). Accordingly, the present study utilized a
dual-echo gradient echo planar imaging (EPI) paradigm to ensure
ATL coverage (Halai et al. 2014).
This study was designed to investigate 3 ideas. A strong ver-
sion of the dual-hub model would predict selective TPC activa-
tion for the associative condition compared with conceptual
similarity and selective ATL activation for the opposite contrast.
A single hub theory such as the hub-and-spokemodel would pre-
dict signiﬁcant positive activation of the ATL in both conditions.
Finally, an alternative explanation of Schwartz et al. (2011) results
is a role of the TPC in some sort of semantic control process that
may be more important for associative relationships but can be
accounted for by a general measure of semantic difﬁculty.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-ﬁve healthy native-English speakers took part in the ex-
periment (16 females, age range 20–42 years, mean age 25.48
years, SD 6.49 years). One was excluded due to low overall per-
formance suggesting inattention/noncompliance (overall per-
formance for this participant 65%, overall performance for
other 24 participants 90%, t(24) = 19.94, P < 0.001). All participants
were strongly right handed, with a laterality quotient above 70
on the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldﬁeld 1971) and
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants gave
informed consent and the study was approved by the local ethics
board.
Stimuli
A semantic judgment task employing trials based on either asso-
ciation or conceptual similarity was employed alongwith a letter
matching task designed to provide a high-level baseline. A
manipulation of semantic control was included in a separate
set of conceptual similarity judgments. Amanipulation of nonse-
mantic control was incorporatedwithin the letter matching task.
An example trial from each condition in each task is displayed in
Table 1.
Semantic Judgment Task
Participants were presented with triads of concrete nouns and
asked to judge which of the 2 options was more related to the
probe word (for full list see Supplementary Table 3). The probe–
target relationship was based on either conceptual similarity or
association. Semantic associative strength was quantiﬁed using
latent semantic analysis, a technique that represents relation-
ships between words based on the degree to which they are
used in similar linguistic contexts. Hoffman, Lambon Ralph
et al. (2013) performed low associative strength (LSA) on the Brit-
ish National Corpus using the standard approach described by
Landauer and Dumais (1997). This corpus includes more than
87 million words from 3125 different sources. A matrix was gen-
erated coding frequency of occurrence for eachword in each con-
text and single-value decomposition was applied to these data,
yielding LSA representations for words based on their contextual
similarity. Pairs of words with a relationship higher than 0.2 in
the resultant LSA measure were considered associated and
lower than 0.2 were not. In order to separate the 2 semantic mea-
sures, associative targets had to have very low levels of concep-
tual similarity, most commonly selected to be in a different
domain (e.g., living vs. artifacts) or, if this was not possible, in a
different superordinate category with a low number of shared
features (e.g., tools vs. clothing). Conversely, conceptually similar
targets were selected from the same semantic category but had
very LSA (scores below 0.2). There was a large, signiﬁcant differ-
ence between the probe–target LSA values for the associative
(average = 0.474, SD = 0.182) versus conceptually similar trials
(average = 0.045, SD = 0.076; t = 20.334, P < 0.001).The associated
and conceptually similar targets were matched on CELEX fre-
quency (associative mean = 28.91, SD = 44.82; conceptually simi-
lar mean = 29.53, SD = 54.50; t(95) = −0.084, P < 0.5), Bristol/MRC
imageability norms (associative mean = 567.69, SD = 62.82; con-
ceptually similar mean = 569.08, SD = 63.95; t(95) =−0.155, P < 0.5),
letter length (associative mean = 5.44, SD = 1.72; conceptually
similar mean = 5.54, SD = 1.72; t(95) = −0.473, P < 0.5) and syllable
length (associative mean = 1.7, SD = 0.7; conceptually similar
mean = 1.68, SD = 0.76; t(95) = 0.222, P < 0.5) taken from theNWatch
program (Davis 2005).
Two trials were derived for each probe, an associative versus a
conceptually similar trial, though individual participants only
saw one version in the experiment (counterbalanced across par-
ticipants). The targets for the associative trials were used as foils
for the similar trials and vice versa, ensuring that the overall set
of words was identical for the 2 conditions, reducing potential
confounds. All foils had an LSAvalue lower than 0.2 with their re-
spective probe and target items, andwere from the same domain
as the target. Foils in the conceptually similar trials were in a dif-
ferent superordinate category making them less conceptually
similar than the targets. The LSA values for the probe—associa-
tive foils (mean = −0.007, SD = 0.059) were matched to those for
the probe—conceptually similar foils (mean = 0.002, SD = 0.061;
t(95) =−1.223, P > 0.05). This meant that the foils in the associative
condition were less associated to the probe than the target
(t(95) =−23.348, P < 0.001) but both were conceptually dissimilar.
Ninety-six associative and 96 conceptual similarity trials
were created. The greater relatedness of the targets than foils
to the probe item was conﬁrmed via 1) similarity ratings on a
Table 1 Example stimuli for each condition in the 3 tasks
Probe Target Foil
Semantic judgment task
Association Vase Tulip Elephant
Conceptual similarity Vase Bucket Platform
Baseline (letter matching) task
Low control demands ##HΨz## bqwcHΨz ctkdLXQ
High control demands ##HΨz## bqwcHΨz cHΨdLXQ
Task to vary semantic control demands
Low control demands Mountain Pyramid Doe
High control demands Mountain Pyramid Arch
Type of semantic relationship was varied in the main semantic judgment task
and the necessary level of control was manipulated in the baseline letter
matching task and separate similarity-based semantic task. In the 2 semantic
tasks, participants chose the word most related to the probe word and in the
baseline task participants chose the item with the most letters from the probe.
Semantic Association versus Conceptual Similarity Jackson et al. | 3
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7-point scale from “not at all similar” to “highly similar” by 11par-
ticipants who did not take part in the fMRI study (t(95) = 29.983, P <
0.001) and 2) a behavioral pilot of 9 participants (9 females,
mean age 19.33 years, SD 1.0) which conﬁrmed high accuracy
on the task in both conditions (association – accuracy = 0.903, RT=
1248.25; conceptual similarity – accuracy = 0.887, RT = 1396.52).
Task to Vary Semantic Control Demand
A further 96probe–target conceptuallysimilar pairswere created in
the same manner as the main task. Two different foils were com-
bined with each target–probe pair. One foil was selected from an
unrelated domain to the probe item in order to minimize the
level of control necessary to reject the foil and select the target
(e.g., –, combined with the foil, ). The other foil
was selected from the same domain and a related category to the
target and probe (e.g., –, paired with the foil, ) and,
thus, greater control was needed in these trials (for full list, see
Supplementary Table 5). Targets were matched to related and un-
related foils on frequency (high; t(95) = , P > 0.5, low; t(95) = , P > 0.5),
imageability (high; t(95)=, P > 0.5, low; t(95)=, P > 0.5), LSA value with
probe (high; t(95) = 0.086, P > 0.5, low; t(95) = 0.009, P > 0.5), letter
length (high; t(95) =−0.216, P > 0.5, low; t(95) = 0.309, P > 0.5), and syl-
lable length (high; t(95) = 0.291, P > 0.5, low; t(95) =−0.212, P > 0.5).
Each participant completed the high control version for half of
the trials and the low control version for the other half (counterba-
lanced across participants). Using the same rating system
described above, participants conﬁrmed greater semantic related-
ness of probe–target than probe–foil in both high control (t(95) =
17.294, P < 0.001) and lowcontrol conditions (t(95) = 13.284, P < 0.001).
Baseline (Letter Matching) Task
The goal of this task was to provide a nonsemantic but challen-
ging visual-matching baseline activity against which the seman-
tic neuroimaging data could be compared. Participants were
asked to indicate which of 2 mixed letter-symbol strings con-
tained more letters in common with the probe string (for full
list see Supplementary Table 4). Probes included a Greek letter,
dissimilar to those found in the English alphabet, ﬂanked by 2
English letters. Hash symbols were then placed either side to
make the string 7 characters long. The target included the same
Greek letter and one or both of the English letters found in the
probe in the same order but at any position in a 7-letter string.
As in the semantic control-varying task, each probe–target pair
had 2 different foils to alter task difﬁculty and thus allow assess-
ment of nonsemantic executive control. Low control foils did not
include any of the same letters as the probe. High control foils in-
cluded theGreek letter and one or 2 of the English letters from the
probe. Each participant received half of the high and half of the
low control foils (counterbalanced across participants). The be-
havioral pilot conﬁrmed that participants were able to perform
the task and that it was as challenging, in terms of RT and accur-
acy, as the main semantic tasks (accuracy = 0.856, RT = 1693.29).
RT for the high control condition (average 2158.85, SD 500.35)
was signiﬁcantly longer than the low control condition (average
1993.48, SD 493.77, t(23) = 4.793, P < 0.001).
Procedure
Participants practiced 20 trials of each task outside the scanner.
Nine trials from each task were then repeated in intermixed
miniblocks to simulate the presentation during scanning. A fur-
ther 9 were repeated inside the scanner. Miniblocks lasted 15 s
and contained 3 trials from one condition. All tasks started
with a central ﬁxation cross presented for 1000 ms. In the ﬁrst
trial of each miniblock, a cue was presented above ﬁxation to
allow participants to prepare for the correct task reducing task-
switching effects. For both semantic tasks, the cue was
“WORDS,” for the letter matching task it was “LETTERS.” The
stimuli were then presented for 4000 ms in Times New Roman
at size 24. The probe was displayed in the top center with the 2
options on the left and right at the bottom of the screen. During
this time, participants responded by pressing one of 2 buttons re-
presenting the left and right options.
There were 4 runs each lasting 10 min. Three contained the
main task, letter matching (baseline) task and rest. One con-
tained the semantic control-varying task and rest. The order of
these was counterbalanced. A pseudorandomized order of mini-
blocks was employed. Presentation of individual trials was ran-
domized within miniblocks. There were 32 miniblocks, each, for
the semantic control task, letter matching task, rest, and the as-
sociative versus conceptually similar versions of the main task.
The lettermatching and semantic control-varying tasks included
16 high and 16 low control miniblocks.
Imaging and Data Analysis
Scanning was performed with a Phillips Achieva 3.0T TX series
system with 32-channel SENSE coil with a SENSE factor of 2.5.
Within the scanner, participants wore noise-cancelling Mk II+
headphones (MR Confon, Magdeburg, Germany). A structural ref-
erence was obtained with an in-plane resolution of 0.938 and
slice thickness of 1.173.
Two echoes were used in parallel. A short echo at 12 ms al-
lows for reduced spin dephasing leading to less signal loss in
areas of high magnetic susceptibility while a standard long
echo at 35 ms maintains high contrast sensitivity throughout
the brain. The use of multiple echoes has been shown to reduce
signal dropout, particularly in inferior temporal and frontal re-
gions (Poser and Norris 2007, 2009; Halai et al. 2014). Combining
the echoes through linear summation has been shown to be op-
timal (Poser et al. 2006; Halai et al. 2014). Each run included 211
functional scans covering the whole brain with a ﬁeld of view
of 240 × 240 mm, resolution matrix of 80 × 80, TR of 2.8, ﬂip
angle of 85°, reconstructed voxel size of 3 mmand slice thickness
of 4 mm. The ﬁeld of viewwas tilted up to 45° off theAC–PC line to
reduce ghosting of the temporal pole.
Analysis was carried out using statistical parametricmapping
(SPM8) software (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging).
Functional images were realigned to the individual’s ﬁrst image
using a rigid body transform in order to correct for motion arti-
facts. The functional images were then coregistered to the indivi-
dual’s anatomical scan. Spatial normalization to the Montreal
Neurological Institute template was achieved using the DARTEL
toolbox (Ashburner 2007) by group-wise registration of indivi-
dual’s gray and white matter to a template brain created from
the group mean. This increases the registration between indivi-
duals from the standard SPM normalization allowing more
accurate localization and greater sensitivity. Smoothing was
performed using an 8 mm full-width half maximum (FWHM)
Gaussian kernel. A general linearmodel was createdwith all con-
ditions modeled as box car functions convolved with a canonical
HRF (rest wasmodeled implicitly). A high-pass ﬁlter with a cutoff
of 128 s was used.
In the ﬁrst analysis step, the main semantic judgment task
was contrasted with the letter matching task to reveal the areas
involved in general semantic processing. Association and con-
ceptual similarity trials were contrasted with the letter matching
task, and were compared directly as well. Effects of semantic
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control demands were assessed by contrasting the high versus
low conditions in the semantic control task. Nonsemantic con-
trol demands were assessed by contrasting high and low control
trials in the baseline letter task. Whole-brain analyses were sub-
jected to FWE correction at the cluster level with a critical cluster
level of 0.05. In the second analysis step, a newmodelwas created
to assess the effect of reaction time onneural activity. Thismodel
included letter matching and semantic conditions, with seman-
tic trialsmodulated by 1) RT and 2) association versus conceptual
similarity. This allowed 1) assessment of which areas increase
their activation for longer semantic decision times, using the
RT regressor, and then 2) a direct comparison of the (association
vs. conceptual similarity) contrast and inﬂuence of semantic de-
cision times—allowing us to assess whether any brain areas are
sensitive to the subtype of semantic knowledge once semantic
RTs are accounted for. In this analysis, RT and relationship type
regressors were entered simultaneously into the model in order
to assess the unique variance of each factor (i.e., we turned off
the default serial orthogonalization option in SPM8). This is pref-
erable to assessing the effect of relationship type after taking out
all the variance that could relate to RT, as this may bias the ﬁnd-
ings to relate to RT alone. Third, conjunction analyses in SPM
were used to compare regions found to be signiﬁcant for the con-
ceptual similarity > association contrast 1) with the areas found
to be more active with high RT throughout the semantic task
and 2) with regions more active for high semantic control > low
semantic control. This form of conjunction analysis is a stringent
measure of overlap because a region is only highlighted if activa-
tion is signiﬁcant after cluster correction in “both” contrasts. Fi-
nally, ROIs were created based on peak co-ordinates from
previous studies (see Results) and analyzed in the MarsBar tool-
box (Brett et al. 2002). ROIs were spheres with a diameter of
10 mm. Statistics were conducted on the mean activation of the
voxels within the ROI.
Results
Behavioral Data
The conceptual similarity judgments (mean RT = 1783.69, SD =
277.44) had signiﬁcantly longer reaction times than the associa-
tive trials (mean RT = 1653.68, SD = 286.48; t(23) = −4.58, P < 0.05).
As designed, the letter matching task was harder than both the
conceptual similarity (mean RT = 2076.16, SD = 265.49; t(23) = 7.33,
P < 0.05) and association-related trials (t(23) = 10.9, P < 0.05), there-
by providing an appropriate a high-level control condition. The
manipulations of control in both the semantic and letter match-
ing tasks successfully led to signiﬁcant differences in RT as ex-
pected (high semantic control [mean RT = 1939.16, SD = 273.71],
low semantic control [mean RT = 1809.55, SD = 299.24]; t(23) = 4.22,
P < 0.05, high nonsemantic control [mean RT = 2158.85, SD =
500.35], low nonsemantic control [mean RT = 1993.48, SD =
493.77]; t(23) = 4.79, P < 0.05)].
Whole-Brain Analyses
Average signal-to-noise ratio of the EPI data is displayed in
Figure 1. This shows the high signal found with dual-echo EPI
throughout the brain including in key inferior temporal and
frontal regions.
Semantic Task versus Letter Matching Task
All whole-brain analyses reported employ an FWE correction at
the cluster level with a critical cluster level of 0.05 as well as
signiﬁcance at the voxel level of 0.001 and are reported in MNI
space. Activation was ﬁrst compared between the semantic and
letter matching tasks. Areas of peak activation for the semantic
task are summarized in Table 2. Both left and right temporal clus-
ters extended across a large region to include the temporal pole,
Heschl’s gyrus, superior temporal gyrus (STG), middle temporal
gyrus (MTG), inferior temporal gyrus (ITG), fusiform gyrus, hippo-
campus, parahippocampal gyrus, amygdala, insula, rolandic
operculum, and cerebellum. Both clusters also extended poster-
iorly to mid-occipital cortex with activity in the angular gyrus
on the left only. In addition, the cluster on the left included infer-
ior frontal gyrus and mid-orbital frontal cortex. The activity
centered round right STG also extended superiorly into the
right pre- and postcentral gyri. Left pre- and postcentral gyri acti-
vation can be seen in a third cluster. Activation within the mid
Figure 1. (A) Average temporal signal-to-noise ratio for the smoothed group echo
planar imaging data in MNI space. Themap is set at a threshold of 40, considered
to be theminimumTSNR required to reliably detect differences in signal (Murphy
et al. 2007; Simmons et al. 2010;Wang et al. 2013) and is displayed as a range from
40 (dark blue) to 200 (bright green). Use of the dual-echo technique meant signal
reached the minimum threshold throughout the ATL and inferior frontal regions
with some subregions far exceeding this with values above 200. (B) Signiﬁcant
activation for the contrasts association judgments > letter matching (red) and
conceptual similarity judgments > letter matching (green); yellow = overlap.
Voxels signiﬁcant at 0.05 with an FWE correction at the cluster level with a
critical cluster level of 0.05.
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cingulum was bilateral and extended superiorly in to left and
right supplementary motor area. The clusters within the cuneus
and medial orbitofrontal cortex were also bilateral with activity
extending from the frontal region inferiorly to the left rectus.
Subtracting the semantic task from the letter matching task
gave a large area of activation throughout bilateral occipital, par-
ietal, and frontal lobes as well as the thalamic nuclei, right puta-
men, right insula, and bilateral posterior fusiform gyrus (see
Table 2).
Association versus Conceptual Similarity
Semantic trials were split into those based on associative relation-
ships versus conceptual similarity to assess to what extent they
share neuronal bases. Signiﬁcant activation maps for each type
of judgment over the letter matching (baseline) task are shown in
Figure 1. The principal ﬁnding is clear—both judgment types re-
sulted in a large common area of activity. In order to assess
whether any areas responded differentially, a direct comparison
of the 2 typesof semantic relationshipwasperformed,highlighting
small differences generally outside of the large shared cluster for
semantic judgments (see Figs 2 and 3aswell as Table 3). Greater ac-
tivationwas found forassociative > conceptual similarity in left su-
pramarginal gyrus extending inferiorly to include STG and
posteriorly to include the angular gyrus (see Fig. 2) and in the
right ITG extending to MTG. The opposite (conceptual similarity >
associative) contrast revealed a difference in the left inferior frontal
gyrus, extending into precentral gyrus, and in a cluster comprising
bilateral supplementary motor area, left superior medial frontal
cortex, and right mid cingulum (see Fig. 3).
Further analyses were conducted at the whole-brain level to
assess whether these differences could be explained in terms
of 2 key performance factors: the required level of semantic con-
trol and generic difﬁculty (as measured by RT). Prefrontal regions
(and other areas) have been implicated in the executive regula-
tion of semantic processing (Thompson-Schill et al. 1997;Wagner
et al. 2001; Badre andWagner 2003; Badre et al. 2005; Noonan et al.
2013) and thus exhibit heightened activation formore difﬁcult se-
mantic judgments or tasks. In line with these many previous
studies, the contrast of high > low control semantic judgments
Table 2 Signiﬁcant activation clusters for the contrast semantic task versus letter matching task
Contrast Region of activation Cluster extent
(voxels)
Max z
value
P value (FWE
corrected)
Peak region Peak MNI
coordinate
X Y Z
Semantic > letter
matching
R temporal 3436 7.02 >0.001 R STG 60 3 −3
R STG 45 −3 −15
R calcarine 27 −48 9
L temporal 5630 7 >0.001 L PHG −21 −21 −21
L MTG −45 −15 −12
L ITG −45 −15 −27
L precentral gyrus 233 5.87 >0.001 L precentral −45 −18 63
L precentral −33 −21 72
Cerebellum 369 5.65 >0.001 R cerebellum 21 −84 −36
L medial frontal 388 5.14 >0.001 L superior MFL −9 48 39
L superior MFL −9 54 30
L superior MFL −9 57 18
Cingulate 166 4.78 0.003 R mid cingulum 12 −3 45
R mid cingulum 3 3 39
R mid cingulum 0 −12 48
L OFC 192 4.71 0.002 L medial OFC −3 54 −12
L anterior
cingulum
−15 42 −3
Cuneus 160 4.4 0.004 R cuneus 9 −84 27
L cuneus −3 −84 27
Letter
matching > semantic
L occipitoparietal
cortex
12 659 7.76 >0.001 L inferior occipital −30 −75 −9
L IPL −42 −39 42
L posterior FG −39 −66 −12
L inferior frontal 3975 7.06 >0.001 L precentral −30 −3 45
L IFG 51 9 27
L IFG 42 9 30
L mid frontal 636 5.91 >0.001 L MFG −39 54 15
L MFG −51 36 30
L MFG −45 39 24
R thalamus 461 5.26 >0.001 R thalamus 9 −15 9
R thalamus 21 −30 6
R thalamus 6 −27 −6
R insula 121 5.07 0.015 R insula 30 21 0
Clusters signiﬁcant at 0.05 after FWE correction. Up to 3 largest peaks listed per cluster L, left; R, right; STG, superior temporal gyrus; PHG, parahippocampal gyrus; MTG,
middle temporal gyrus; ITG, inferior temporal gyrus; MFL, medial frontal lobe; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex.
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revealed large areas of the frontal and occipital lobes as well as
the inferior and superior parietal lobes and fusiform gyrus ex-
tending to inferior temporal and parahippocampal gyri (see
Fig. 2D and Table 4) . Conjunction analyses of the conceptual
similarity > association contrast with this semantic control ma-
nipulation (see Fig. 3B) and with the RT in the semantic trials
(see Fig. 3A) showed large areas of conjunction. This indicates
that the signiﬁcantly greater activity for conceptual similarity >
associative judgments observed in inferior frontal and supple-
mentarymotor areas can be explained in terms of the greater ex-
ecutive demands of thesemore difﬁcult semantic judgments. No
overlap was found between semantic control regions and those
revealed by the associative > conceptual similarity contrast (see
Fig. 2D).
Next, as the associative and conceptual similarity conditions
differed in average reaction time (see above), an analysis was run
to assess which areas differ according to semantic task RT (i.e.,
task difﬁculty) versuswhich regions differed by condition regard-
less of RT (indicating a true effect of the type of semantic relation-
ship). Figure 3 shows conjunction analyses of the areas where
activation is correlated positively with RT (see Fig. 3A) and the
areas found to have higher activation for conceptual similarity
judgments (the condition with the longer average RT, see
Fig. 3B; see Behavioral Results and Supplementary Fig. 2 for the
coordinates of peak activation). The results of these contrasts
overlapped within the IFG, supporting the idea that conceptual
similarity judgments activated this area to a greater extent sim-
ply because they were more demanding. The contrast of concep-
tual similarity > association with RT included in the samemodel
found no signiﬁcant differences. Therefore, these regions were
not activated more for conceptual similarity per se, but rather
for trials of any relationship type requiringmore effortful seman-
tic processing.
Finally, we considered areas that were deactivated by the se-
mantic task, relative to rest. Both the left supramarginal gyrus
and right ATL clusters identiﬁed in the associative > conceptual
similarity contrast overlapped with a broader set of regions
which showed signiﬁcant deactivation from rest regardless of
task (see Fig. 2A and Supplementary Table 1). As shown in Fig-
ure 2B, the difference between the associative and conceptual
similarity-based trials in these areas reﬂected a differential de-
activation. Various previous studies, across different cognitive
domains, have demonstrated that the deactivation, commonly
observed in ventral parietal cortex (a part of the default-mode
network), is anticorrelated with task difﬁculty (Fox et al. 2005;
Buckner et al. 2008; Harrison et al. 2011; Gilbert et al. 2012;
Figure 2. Assessment of the areas found for the association > conceptual similarity contrast without RT included in the model. (A) Areas with signiﬁcantly greater
activation for the contrast association > similarity (red) shown over the signiﬁcant regions for the contrast rest > semantic (blue). (B) Effect sizes for a 10-mm spherical
ROI centered around the peak of activity in the left supramarginal gyrus within the contrast association > conceptual similarity for the conditions associative (orange),
conceptual similarity (purple), low control letter matching (dark gray) and high control letter matching (light gray) over rest. (C) Effect sizes for a 10-mm spherical ROI
centered around the peak of activity in the right anterior temporal lobe within the contrast association > conceptual similarity for the conditions associative (orange),
similarity (purple), low control letter matching (dark gray) and high control letter matching (light gray) over rest. Asterisks denote signiﬁcant contrasts at P < 0.05 after
application of a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Both ROIs show deactivation from rest for both forms of semantic relationship and the letter
matching task (easy vs. hard conditions). Thus, the association > conceptual similarity contrast is due to differences in deactivation. No differences are signiﬁcant if
RT is included in the model (see text). (D) Signiﬁcant activation for the contrast high semantic control > low semantic control (yellow) is overlaid on the
association > conceptual similarity contrast (red). These regions did not overlap. Voxels signiﬁcant at 0.001 with an FWE correction at the cluster level with a critical
cluster level of 0.05.
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Figure 3. (A) A conjunction analysis of the contrast conceptual similarity > association (green) and the areas responding more to trials with long reaction times in the
semantic task (blue). Areas of conjunction are shown in yellow. A high level of conjunction can be identiﬁed. (B) A conjunction analysis of the contrasts conceptual
similarity > association (green) and high semantic control > low semantic control (red). Areas of conjunction are shown in yellow. A high level of conjunction is
present. Voxels included in the conjunction analyses were signiﬁcant at 0.001 with an FWE correction at the cluster level with a critical cluster level of 0.05. The
differences between association and conceptual similarity may be explained by the level of difﬁculty of a general semantic process. No differences between
association and conceptual similarity are signiﬁcant if RT is included in the model. (C) Effect sizes for a 10-mm spherical ROI centered around the peak of activity in
the left inferior frontal gyrus within the contrast conceptual similarity > association for the conditions associative (orange), conceptual similarity (purple), low control
letter matching (dark gray), and high control letter matching (light gray) over rest. Asterisks denote signiﬁcant contrasts (P < 0.05) after application of a Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons.
Table 3 Signiﬁcant activation clusters for the direct comparison of association and conceptual similarity
Contrast Region of activation Cluster extent
(voxels)
Max z value P value
(FWE corrected)
Peak MNI coordinate
X Y Z
Association > conceptual
similarity
R inferior temporal
gyrus
131 4.17 0.038 54 −9 −27
Association > conceptual
similarity
L supramarginal
and angular gyrus
161 3.76 0.018 −63 −45 36
Conceptual
similarity > association
L inferior frontal
gyrus
728 5.38 >0.001 −42 30 6
Conceptual
similarity > association
L supplementary
motor area
150 3.92 0.024 −6 12 54
Clusters signiﬁcant at 0.05 after FWE correction. Largest peak listed per cluster.
L, left; R, right.
Table 4 Signiﬁcant activation clusters for the semantic control manipulation (high control conceptual similarity > low control conceptual
similarity)
Region of activation Cluster extent (voxels) Max z value P value (FWE corrected) Peak MNI coordinate
X Y Z
L inferior frontal gyrus 2386 6 >0.001 −51 15 27
L calcarine sulcus 519 4.93 >0.001 −9 −96 −9
R inferior frontal gyrus 373 4.9 >0.001 48 18 27
R mid frontal gyrus 253 4.76 0.001 36 21 54
L fusiform gyrus 210 4.63 0.004 −39 −21 −24
R inferior orbitofrontal cortex 153 4.63 0.016 30 24 −6
R calcarine sulcus 168 4.11 0.011 18 −93 −3
L inferior parietal cortex 194 4.11 0.006 −30 −69 45
Clusters signiﬁcant at 0.05 after FWE correction. Largest peak listed per cluster.
L, left; R, right.
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Humphreys and Lambon Ralph 2014). Indeed, the differential de-
activation for associative versus conceptual trials observed in
ventral parietal cortex was no longer signiﬁcant when reaction
timewas included as a parametric regressor. Thismeans that de-
activation of these regions doesnot differ by relationship type but
rather reﬂects the difﬁculty of general semantic processing. In
fact, no differences were found between the association and con-
ceptual similarity trials anywhere in the brain when semantic RT
was included in themodel. Differential activation in a number of
regions was found to relate to indices of general semantic difﬁ-
culty but no differences were shown to relate to relationship
type, per se.
Region-of-Interest Analyses
Region-of-interest analyses were conducted to test the dual-hub
model’s predictions that ATL is involved speciﬁcally in coding
conceptual similarity-based relationships and TPC in associative
relationships. One ATL ROI locatedwithin anterior STSwas taken
fromSchwartz et al. (2011), who had identiﬁed this region as a po-
tential representational hub for conceptual similarity (with re-
spect to speech production). Another, from the ventral ATL,
was taken from Binney et al.’s (2010) distortion-corrected fMRI
study of synonym judgments, which has been proposed as the
centerpoint of a graded transmodal semantic hub (Lambon
Ralph et al. 2010; Lambon Ralph 2014). This ventral ATL area
has been found inmultiple imaging studies across tasks andmo-
dalities (Marinkovic et al. 2003; Sharp et al. 2004; Spitsyna et al.
2006; Visser and Lambon Ralph 2011; Visser et al. 2012) and is
an area of maximal atrophy and hypometabolism in semantic
dementia, which directly correlateswith their degree of semantic
impairment (Galton et al. 2001; Butler et al. 2009;Mion et al. 2010).
The coordinates of the TPJ ROI was taken from Schwartz et al.
(2011) in order to assess the claim that this region reﬂects the
site of a hub for associative semantics. The TPC peak was located
at the junction of Brodmann areas 21, 22, 39, 40, 41, 42, and 48 (see
Fig. 4).
The results of the ROI analyses for each contrast are listed in
Table 5 and summarized in Figure 4. Neither ATL ROI showed a
signiﬁcant difference between association and conceptual simi-
larity judgments (see Table 5), with the ventral ATL ROI showing
the strongest activations for both semantic conditions over the
letter matching baseline. The superior ATL ROI also showed sig-
niﬁcantly greater yet equivalent activation for the semantic judg-
ments over the active baseline (which was deactivated with
respect to rest). Indeed, these results underline previous observa-
tions that ATL semantic activations are much more likely to be
detected when an active baseline is used (see Visser et al. 2010).
In line with the whole-brain analyses, these ROI ﬁndings under-
line the conclusion that theATL is implicated in general semantic
representation regardless of relationship type (see Fig. 4). In con-
trast to the ATL ROIs, all conditions showed signiﬁcant deactiva-
tion from rest within the TPJ ROI. Neither conceptual similarity
nor association conditions were signiﬁcantly more de-activated
than the letter matching task, or each other. Deactivation did
not relate to reaction time or semantic control. Thus, counter to
the dual-hub hypothesis, this study found no evidence in favor of
this region supporting associative semantics.
Discussion
The clear, principal ﬁnding from this study was that semantic
judgments based on either associative relationships or concep-
tual similarity engaged the same neural network, including
bilateral ATL, posterior temporal regions and left IFG. These
areas ﬁt well with previous neuroimaging and neuropsychologic-
al ﬁndings regarding their roles in general, multimodal semantic
cognition (Thompson-Schill et al. 1999; Jefferies and Lambon
Ralph 2006; Vigneau et al. 2006; Patterson et al. 2007; Binder
et al. 2009; Binney et al. 2010; Binder and Desai 2011; Visser
et al. 2012; Noonan et al. 2013) and suggest that both forms of se-
mantic knowledge arise from a single network (see below).
The 3 issues presented in the Introduction section were eluci-
dated. The selective differences between the ATL and TPC pre-
dicted by a strong version of the dual-hub model were not
identiﬁed in whole-brain or ROI analyses. We found little evi-
dence for differential activation in the regions hypothesized,
under the dual-hub proposal, to represent associative and con-
ceptual similarity separately. The expectation from single hub-
and-spoke model of signiﬁcant positive activation of the ATL
for both relationship types was met. The ATL was strongly and
signiﬁcantly activated by semantic judgments regardless of rela-
tionship type, consistent with both its proposed role as a graded,
transmodal, pan-category representational hub (Patterson et al.
2007; Lambon Ralph et al. 2010; Lambon Ralph 2014), and the
poor performance on both types of judgment exhibited by pa-
tients with semantic dementia (in the context of ATL-centered
atrophy: Jefferies and Lambon Ralph 2006; Butler et al. 2009;
Hoffman, Jones et al. 2013).
The role of the TPC was less clear as both types of semantic
relationship showed deactivation from rest, as did the letter
matching baseline task and no signiﬁcant differences were
found between association and conceptual similarity. This area
is part of a wider region associated with deactivation from rest,
including ventral parietal cortex, that is, the default-mode net-
work (e.g., Buckner et al. 2008). Although no differences between
the 2 conditions were found in the TPC, the effect of general se-
mantic control and difﬁculty was found to be critical for under-
standing the role of regions outside the ROIs. Beyond these 2
regions, the only areas to be identiﬁed as more active for concep-
tual similarity than associative semantic judgments were the in-
ferior prefrontal cortex and supplementary motor area. This
result reﬂected differential semantic difﬁculty (highlighted by
the overlap of conceptual similarity > associative and hard > easy
semantic judgment contrasts) and is consistentwith inferior pre-
frontal cortex’s role on controlled semantic processing as de-
monstrated by previous neuroimaging, neuropsychological and
TMS studies (Thompson-Schill et al. 1997; Wagner et al. 2001;
Badre and Wagner 2003; Badre et al. 2005; Jefferies and Lambon
Ralph 2006; Hoffman et al. 2010; Noonan et al. 2013). Indeed,
after accounting for the differences in reaction time between
the 2 conditions, no areas were found to exhibit differences be-
tween the 2 types of semantic judgment. The importance ofmea-
sures of general semantic difﬁculty was highlighted as
differences appearing to relate to relationship type were shown
to relate to semantic difﬁculty alone. This included differences
in both positive activation and in deactivation.
By keeping the task instructions the same and giving no expli-
cit direction to use different sub-types of knowledge for the 2 con-
ditions, we assessed whether there was an automatic, neural
distinction between association and conceptual similarity. It is
possible that explicit task instructions could differentially en-
hance activation of one subtype of conceptual knowledge and
drive greater variation in the activation of distinct neural regions
(Wisniewski and Bassok 1999). This could be explored in future
studies. However, the negative side of this approach would be
that any resultant differences might reﬂect metacognitive pro-
cesses rather than the type of knowledge.
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Relationship to Previous Neuropsychological Findings
The results correspond well with neuropsychological data. Both
semantic aphasia and semantic dementia patients show impair-
ment on explicit tests of semantic associations and conceptually
similar items, as well as impaired feature knowledge (Bozeat
et al. 2000; Jefferies and Lambon Ralph 2006; Hoffman, Jones
et al. 2013). This is because both groups have damage to the gen-
eral semantic network found to code associations and concep-
tual similarities; in semantic dementia to the ATL and in
semantic aphasia to pMTG, ventral parietal cortex or IFG (Jefferies
and Lambon Ralph 2006; Patterson et al. 2007). Previously,
Goldstein (1936, 1948) considered semantic aphasic patients to
be overly sensitive to associative relationships, with little inﬂu-
enceof conceptual similarity.However, these clinical observations
were not controlled to the same extent as this experiment. In-
deed, these conclusions may arise, in part, from the underesti-
mation of the importance of associative thinking in healthy
adults, identiﬁed more recently (Lin and Murphy 2001).
Figure 4. Location and effect sizes of the 3 ROIs. Schwartz et al.’s (2011) aSTS region is shown in green (MNI coordinates =−53 18 −30) with the ventral ATL ROI from Binney
et al. (2010) in red (MNI coordinates =−36 −15 −30). Schwartz et al.’s (2011) TPJ ROI is displayed in blue (MNI coordinates =−52 −49 27). The effect sizes of each condition
against rest are displayed for each ROI for the conditions associative (red), similarity (green), low control lettermatching (light blue), and high control lettermatching (dark
blue) over rest. Asterisks denote signiﬁcant contrasts after application of a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (P < 0.05). Tilde denotes a trend toward
signiﬁcance (P < 0.1).
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Despite the consistency between this experiment and exist-
ing neuropsychological data, the same harmony does not hold
if rates of different types of speech errors are measured. If asso-
ciation and conceptual similarity rely on the same multimodal
semantic network, why are different semantic error types linked
to different regions after brain damage? Semantic aphasic pa-
tients make amixture of associative, categorical and superordin-
ate semantic errors, whereas semantic dementia patients rarely,
if ever, produce associative semantic errors (Jefferies and
Lambon Ralph 2006). Although generating fewer errors overall,
neurologically intact participants generate the same ratio of se-
mantic error types as that observed in a large group of patients
with post-stroke aphasia (Schwartz et al. 2011). The naming er-
rors in SD are consistent with the progressive collapse and
degradation of the underpinning semantic representations
(Lambon Ralph et al. 2001). The characteristic of this semantic
impairment is that it is increasingly difﬁcult for the semantic sys-
tem 1) to separate conceptually similar items (leading to category
and superordinate errors) and 2) to generate speciﬁc information
linked to each concept, including its name (the most common
error type in SD is an omission error), speciﬁc features and asso-
ciations (Warrington 1975; Lambon Ralph et al. 2001). The inabil-
ity to generate detailed information about each concept will
mean that associative naming errors are very unlikely. Indeed,
Jefferies and LambonRalph (2006) noted that the presence of con-
ceptually speciﬁc associative errors in SA (e.g., → “nuts”)
implies a very good underlying semantic database.
These factors probably explain, at least in part, the innovative
voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping (VLSM) results reported
by Schwartz et al. As lesions encroach upon ATL regions,
category-related errors will tend to increase and associative er-
rors decrease (as per SD patients). The second effect to account
for in the Schwartz et al. study is the “relative” increase in asso-
ciative over categorical errors linked to TPC lesions. Perhaps the
most obvious possibility follows from the fact that speech pro-
duction is complex and involves multiple stages (Dell and Reich
1981). Associative errors may arise from a nonsemantic stage
linked to TPC or a nearby area. For instance, the angular gyrus
has been shown to activate for sentence-level and syntactical
processing (Petersson et al. 2012; Zhu et al. 2012). It is entirely
possible that these mechanisms may partially activate lexically
associated words (a natural outcome of their role in connected-
speech and sentence construction) and, under damage or poor
control, these alternatives are incorrectly produced by the pa-
tients during picture naming tasks. A second possibility is statis-
tical. Given that Schwartz et al. (2011) reported “partial”
correlations (categorical|associative vs. associative|categorical),
it is possible that the presence of patients with ATL lesions and
less associative errors within the entire dataset will automatical-
ly generate a mirror-image partial correlation for the remaining
patients with non-ATL MCA lesions. This is consistent with the
fact that, in the patient data overall, the ratio of different seman-
tic error types was the same that observed in neurologically in-
tact participants. If this explanation is correct then there is, in
effect, only a single dissociation present in those results (ATL le-
sions decreasing the rate of associative errors). If, however, there
was an absolute increase in associative errors in the TPC sub-
group (i.e., signiﬁcantlymore than that observed in general apha-
sic and control groups, overall) then an alternative explanation is
required.
Table 5 Independent ROI analyses
ROI Contrast Effect size T value Bonferroni-corrected
P value
ATL (Schwartz) Association > rest −0.11 −1.69 0.937
Conceptual Similarity > rest −0.13 −2.19 0.347
Low control letter matching > rest −0.27 −3.77 <0.05
High control letter matching > rest −0.37 −4.00 <0.05
Association > letter matching 0.43 3.90 <0.05
Conceptual similarity > letter matching 0.39 3.50 <0.05
Association > conceptual similarity 0.02 0.47 1
High > low semantic control 0.00 0.01 1
High > low nonsemantic control −0.10 −1.84 0.703
ATL (Binney) Association > rest 0.26 3.87 <0.05
Conceptual similarity > rest 0.23 3.53 <0.05
Low control letter matching > rest −0.18 −3.47 <0.05
High control letter matching > rest −0.20 −3.02 0.055
Association > letter matching 0.90 9.07 <0.001
Conceptual similarity > letter matching 0.85 8.69 <0.001
Association > conceptual similarity 0.03 1.05 1
High > low semantic control 0.06 4.85 <0.001
High > low nonsemantic control −0.02 −0.47 1
L TPC (Schwartz) Association > rest −0.27 −4.02 <0.05
Conceptual similarity > rest −0.41 −5.93 <0.001
Low control letter matching > rest −0.28 −4.03 <0.05
High control letter Matching > rest −0.39 −4.81 <0.001
Association > letter matching 0.13 1.29 1
Conceptual similarity > letter matching −0.15 −1.51 1
Association > conceptual similarity 0.14 2.75 0.104
High > low semantic control 0.00 0.12 1
High > low nonsemantic control −0.11 −1.98 0.541
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How Could Association and Conceptual Similarity Arise
Out of One Representational System?
The primary result of this study was that processing of semantic
associations and conceptual similarity rely upon the same se-
mantic neural network. What does this imply for theories of se-
mantic representation? First and foremost, it would seem to
suggest that these 2 important forms of semantic knowledge
are coded within a single neurocomputational system. Below,
we consider how this might be achieved within a neuroanatomi-
cally inspired, computationally implemented framework such as
the hub-and-spoke model (Rogers et al. 2004; Patterson et al.
2007; Lambon Ralph et al. 2010; Lambon Ralph 2014).
The key ideas are as follows. Concepts are built from, and re-
ﬂect the characteristics of, our multimodal experiences which
are acquired, typically, over a long period of time. Registration
of the information arising in each input/output modality (“en-
grams” in the classical neurological accounts of conceptualiza-
tion; Eggert 1977) is achieved within secondary association
cortices (the spokes within the hub-and-spoke framework). Ac-
cording to one implemented computational model (Rogers
et al. 2004), these different sources of information are drawn to-
gether through interaction with a transmodally connected repre-
sentational hub (centered on the ventrolateral ATL; Binney et al.
2012) which integrates over time, contexts and modalities to ex-
tract generalizable, coherent conceptual representations and
computes the many nonlinear relationships between each con-
cept and its linked elements or “features” of knowledge (Lambon
Ralph et al. 2010; Lambon Ralph 2014). It is the co-occurrence of
features identiﬁed by the hub that gives rise to semantic struc-
ture and conceptual similarity in computational models, hier-
archical cluster analysis and feature databases (Rogers et al.
2004; Dilkina and Lambon Ralph 2013). Graded conceptual simi-
larity is an emergent property of this computational framework
and reﬂects these deeper statistical structures present in our
multimodal experience (Rogers et al. 2004; Lambon Ralph et al.
2010). Indeed, the model captured not only hierarchical, taxo-
nomic-like structure, where it exists (e.g., within natural categor-
ies) but also strong and weak similarities among other types of
(nontaxonomic) concept.
Although not considered explicitly in the original computa-
tional exploration, it is possible that the same framework
would code associations between concepts in the same way as
the link between any concept and its “features”. Indeed, it is pos-
sible that “features” and “associations” are one and the same
thing—i.e., the smorgasbord of information that is linked to a
concept. Speciﬁcally, themodel learns tomap between a concept
and all of its associated/linked information (as described in the
Introduction for ). The verbal and nonverbal “features”
of croissants (e.g., the name “croissant,” “crescent shaped,” “ed-
ible,” etc.) are simply elements of experience that reliably co-
occur in time and context, and therefore coalesce to form an in-
tegrated concept of the object. From this perspective, “associa-
tions” (e.g., <coffee>) can be thought of as additional elements
of experience that are also often present and thus become inte-
grated into the concept. In otherwords, there is no strong distinc-
tion between an item’s “associations” and its “features.” They are
all simply aspects of the environment that are experienced to-
gether when the item is encountered.
The information that is linked to each concept (whether “fea-
tures” or “associations”) varies along at least 3 different dimen-
sions: 1) in which sensory-verbal modalities it is experienced; 2)
the range of concepts to which each piece of information/feature
is linked (i.e., shared vs. distinctive features: Garrard et al. 2005;
Tyler et al. 2013); and 3) its experiential frequency (i.e., how
often each piece of information is experienced alongside the con-
cept—e.g., “buttery taste” and  are very commonly
paired but “chocolate ﬁlling” is a less frequent feature). Both “fea-
tures” and “associates” can vary in their speciﬁcity (applicable to
individual or collections of concept) and can be extracted from
verbal or nonverbal experience. Even a distinction between in-
ternal (e.g., parts of the object) versus external (i.e., present in
the environment outside of that object; as described in Lin and
Murphy 2001) information does not necessarily distinguish be-
tween “features” and “associations” given that, like associations,
many “features” are external to the object (e.g., “buttery smell,”
“ﬂaky texture,” etc.). We should note here that “associates”
have the key characteristic of co-occurring in time or place, ver-
bally (e.g., lexical associates “French croissants”) or nonverbally
(e.g., seeing croissants and coffee next to each other). Our work-
ing hypothesis does not reject this fact but rather observes that
this is true to varying degrees (i.e., experiential frequency) for
all information/“features” linkedwith aconcept. Second, if differ-
ent cognitive and neural systems code conceptual similarity ver-
sus “association” structures then a potential homunculus
problem arises in terms of which subsystem should code the in-
formation (e.g., are “warmed in the oven,” “made from a yeast
dough,” features or associations?). How do associates and fea-
tures relate to the task used here? In conceptual similarity trials,
presentation of the probe and target concepts activates many
overlapping features. These shared features allow the participant
to choose the target as related to the probe. As features are learnt
throughout life, the amount of overlap between sets of concepts
forms a structure reﬂecting conceptual similarity, thus allowing
conceptual similarity to emerge from the co-activation of sets
of features. In the association trials, the same sets of co-activated
features become engaged in the same way but here the sum dif-
ference is not important. Instead, some of these activated fea-
tures are generally termed “associates” and identiﬁcation of
this link allows the participant to choose the target item. In sum-
mary, according to this hypothesis, each concept is linked or as-
sociated with a range of verbal and nonverbal experiential
information, and conceptual similarity reﬂects the deeper statis-
tical structure extracted across these concept-to-associations/
features structures.
Finally, we note that associations could be considered to be
one of a number of kinds of representation responsible for coding
sequences and time-based information (e.g., schemas, syntax,
etc.). Although semantic associations were not found to rely on
a distinct cortical network, this does not mean that there are no
systems for coding temporal or spatial statistical structures. Ra-
ther, it seems likely that these structures are orthogonal to se-
mantically related representations and are coded in different
neural regions, such as the ventral parietal cortex, which has
been shown to be involved in processing syntax, numbers, and
space (e.g., frontoparietal “dorsal” vs. “ventral” temporal lobe
pathways: Walsh 2003; Ueno et al. 2011; Petersson et al. 2012;
Zhu et al. 2012; Bornkessel-Schlesewsky and Schlesewsky 2013).
Conclusions and Future Directions
When general semantic difﬁculty is accounted for, association
and conceptual similarity rely on the same cortical network re-
sponsible for semantic cognition including ATL, posterior tem-
poral, and inferior frontal cortex. In order to gain further
insights about howassociation and conceptual similaritymay re-
late, future computational models of semantic cognition should
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address 2 challenges. If there is indeed no strong distinction be-
tween features and associations, models should be able to dem-
onstrate both how associations and other features are linked to
each concept, as well as how the deeper, graded conceptual simi-
larities emerge out of a uniﬁed framework as suggested by the
current neuroimaging and neuropsychological data from seman-
tic dementia and semantic aphasia. In addition, successful mod-
els should be able to show how the differential distributions of
aphasia naming errors arise from this uniﬁed framework.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material can be found at: http://www.cercor.
oxfordjournals.org.
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